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INTRODUCTION
The fight for same-sex marriage is one of the most
divisive political issues in American society. As is the case for
many other controversial political topics-racial desegregation
and abortion, among others-the courts played an integral role
in the campaign for same-sex marriage, as state supreme
courts heard cases brought by activists and decided in favor of
a legal right to marriage between two persons of the same
gender. Only after the first few legal victories did the issue
enter the political arena in full force, in vehement and often
vitriolic attacks on same-sex marriage by conservative
politicians that resulted in the federal Defense of Marriage Act
as well as over a dozen state constitutional amendments
prohibiting same-sex marriage.
Supporters of same-sex
marriage have begun to fight in the political sphere as well, but
most of the major victories for same-sex relationships have
been won in courts and later codified in law, while the
opposition to same-sex marriage has been more aggressively
and exclusively political, using the issue of same-sex marriage
not only to pass laws and state constitutional amendments
directly prohibiting same-sex marriage, but also using the issue
to arouse the passion of voters to marshal support for a broad
array of conservative issues and candidates.
The realms of the legal and the political overlap, but the
dispute over same-sex marriage raises interesting and puzzling
questions of exactly where the overlap occurs, and in what
way-and how successfully-activists have tried to function in
two spheres at once. As Ellen Ann Andersen notes, the legal
and the cultural frames are "mutually constitutive," the
discourses and symbols of one shaping the understandings of
the other.1 Thus social movements working for political change
use the language of legal rights when arguing for a change in
social understandings, and as social understandings change the
law generally follows. 2 The task of a legal activist, therefore, is
1 ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS

(2005).
2
Id.

13-14
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to puzzle out how the give and take of mutually constitutive
spheres will interact with specific cases and policy goals.
A threshold question is whether it is more effective to
initiate a social movement in the legal or in the political
sphere.
Mark Tushnet argues that modern progressives
consistently choose the legal sphere, explaining, "Liberals
today seem to have a deep-rooted fear of voting. They are more
enthusiastic about judicial review than recent experience
3
justifies, because they are afraid of what the people will do."
Certainly in the context of same-sex marriage, the first legal
battles took place before societal opinion began to turn. Even
with the benefit of hindsight, however, the effect of fighting
early battles in courtrooms rather than state legislatures or
public discourse generally is difficult to identify. Conventional
wisdom seems to be that as same-sex marriage became the
subject of litigation in state supreme courts, conservative
politicians seized upon the specter of gay marriage as fuel for
their political fire, using public revulsion at the thought of
widespread gay marriage to pass scores of laws against samesex marriage and converting the public's opposition to same-sex
marriage into support for conservative politics generally.
Certainly there is some truth in this: in 2004, following the
Massachusetts decision Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health in November 2003 holding that to deny same-sex
couples marriage violated the state constitution, thirteen states
passed amendments to their state constitutions banning samesex marriage in some form, sometimes banning any legal
recognition of same-sex partnerships entirely. 4 Analysts also
discussed the possibility that the issue of same-sex marriage
was a significant factor, even a determinative one, in the
5
presidential election that same year.

3MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 177
(1999).
4 DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 175
(2006).
5 E.g., Gregory B. Lewis, Same-sex Marriage and the 2004 Presidential
Election, 38 POL. SCI. & POLS. 195, 195 (2005).
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It is this circumstance that Gerald Rosenberg discusses
6
edition of The Hollow Hope, published this year.
second
in the
The first edition, published in 1991, has become one of the most
influential works in constitutional law and political science,
mustering an extremely persuasive argument that progressives
should not look to the courts to effect lasting and significant
social change, as several limitations upon the courts' power to
enforce change and their likelihood to sanction that change
make it unlikely that the courts can be used as tools of
progressive action. Rather, Rosenberg argues, activists should
focus their efforts on the political branches of government, only
using courts to supplement and cement political victories.
In the introduction to the second edition, which adds a
fourth Part focused on same-sex marriage, Rosenberg explains
the impetus for adding this topic to his discussions of civil
rights, women's rights, and environmentalism:
I was standing in the ballroom of a hotel at the
1995 meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools when a voice boomed out across the
room, catching everyone's attention: "Rosenberg,"
the voice called out excitedly, "I've got you!" The
speaker was a professor at Yale Law School from
whom I had taken a class. After exchanging
pleasantries, I asked him what he meant. He
responded with one word: "Hawaii."...
he
right to same-sex marriage was on the verge of

being won nationwide through litigation. I knew,
then, that I had to investigate the litigation
7
effort to win the right to same-sex marriage.

After several chapters of research and analysis,
Rosenberg concludes that on the whole the same-sex marriage
litigation movement has failed, and failed at least in part
because activists chose to act through the courts rather than
through the political branches-proving once again his overall
6 GERALD N. ROsENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN CouRTs BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE?

7Id. at xi.

(2d ed., 2008).
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argument. He argues that the gay marriage movement can be
summarized as "one step forward,9 two steps back" because
activists "turned to courts too soon.
Rosenberg acknowledges that the picture is muddied,
recognizing the "one step forward" of progress even as he
argues that the net effect of the court cases has been negative.
For example, in Massachusetts itself, not only did Goodridge
secure the right to same-sex marriage, but the political and
social context was changed: new interest groups were created
as a result of Goodridge, and the legislative debate about samesex marriage following the court's decision clearly resulted in a
shift among state legislators in favor of allowing it. 1° In the
election following Baker v. State, the Vermont same-sex
marriage case, legislative Democrats who passed a civil union
law lost some electoral ground but retained a legislative
majority, and Governor Howard Dean, who signed the bill into
law, was reelected.1 1
Rosenberg's analysis, however, is incomplete.
He
thoroughly examines the different responses of different groups
of people to the cases-indeed, one of the most crucial elements
of his analysis is what he terms the "stunningly successful
countermobilization" against same-sex marriage. 12 Yet his
examination of the legal activist groups fighting for same-sex
marriage omits some important questions.
For example,
Rosenberg argues that such groups chose to commence lawsuits
in pursuit of same-sex marriage too early, but fails to ask the
threshold question of whether the activist organizations
initiated the litigation or were drawn into legal processes set in
motion by others. Rosenberg offers a common-sense definition
of the goal of activist organizations, but does not examine his
intuitive formulation of their demand and question whether
other purposes are in play. And finally, Rosenberg identifies
what he sees as catastrophic failures to integrate legal and

8 Id. at 368.
9 Id. at 416.
10 PINELLO, supra note 4, at 182.
"DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATrLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE 251, 260-61 (2004).

12 ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 417.
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political activism, but fails to consider whether such
integration has improved over time.
This Article will examine three of Rosenberg's central
claims in the context of the fight for same-sex marriage. First,
that activists seeking to advance same sex marriage
erroneously chose the courts rather than the political arena to
advance their goals. If progressive groups were largely drawn
into litigation initiated by others, then the issue is at least
clarified: would it have been better or wiser to ignore existing
litigation, permitting legal defeat, in order to concentrate on
more gradual political change. Second, that the goals of samesex marriage activists can be assessed via a binary outcomerelated standard: whether legitimization of same-sex marriage
was achieved or failed. If Rosenberg has mischaracterized the
objectives of the progressive movement regarding equal rights
for gays, then his measurement of the success of the movement
is called into doubt. Third, that the advocates for same-sex
marriage failed to properly coordinate legal and political
efforts. Even if this were true at the outset of organized
attempts to effectuate same-sex marriage, if progressives
learned over time to better meld litigation with political
activism, Rosenberg's wholesale condemnation
of the
movement should be qualified.
Part I begins by discussing Rosenberg's theory,
specifically the new sections of the second edition focusing on
same-sex marriage, in order to identify elements of his
arguments that will be tested in later Parts. Part II examines
the question of whether legal activist groups should be
understood to have independently brought lawsuits aimed at
achieving same-sex marriage on their own initiative. Part III
discusses the goals of such lawsuits, highlighting the
subgroups in play and how their goals complicate Rosenberg's
view. Part IV analyzes the coordination of both legal and
political campaigns, and challenges Rosenberg's arguments
that there was effectively no meaningful or successful
coordination.

8
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I - ROSENBERG'S ARGUMENTS

Since 1991, when the first edition of The Hollow Hope
was
published,
Rosenberg
has
provided
a
strong
counterargument to the traditional, if perhaps facile, view of
the Supreme Court as vindicating individual rights. Rosenberg
famously argued that courts in fact do not and have never
actually produced meaningful societal change. Rather, the
place of courts in the history of reform movements is more
limited and dependent on other branches. Courts can provide
an official recognition of an evolving shift that is already taking
place, can occasionally vindicate an argument with broad
popular support that has not been acted on in the political
branches, and can slow or stop reform movements in the
political branches-but they cannot be the engine of change
themselves. 13 In both The Hollow Hope and his later writings,
Rosenberg offers various reasons for the court's impotence: the
lack of independent enforcement powers, dependence on the
political branches for such enforcement and establishment of
the judiciary itself through the appointments process, and
reliance upon largely conservative precedents-among which
14
he counts the Constitution-to support new rulings.
Rosenberg does recognize that court action may have
some impact on the political and social realms, but not in a way
that activists intend: while court actions rarely mobilize
supporters of progressive goals, incremental court decisions
may motivate the opposition.' 5 He believes that the cases
asserting a right to same-sex marriage demonstrate the
dangers of backlash, and the ultimate failure (and danger) of
litigating too soon. For example, he summarizes the long-term
13 GERALD

N.

ROSENBERG,

THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT

SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991).

14 Id. at 336-37; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, Courting Disaster: Looking for
Change in All the Wrong Places,54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 808 (2006).
15 ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 341. (Other scholars have fleshed out
Rosenberg's thesis, notably Michael Klarman's work proposing a "Brown
backlash thesis." Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 85 (1994); see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR

RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)).
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consequences of Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii case that
ultimately was resolved in a state constitutional amendment
prohibiting same-sex marriage paired with a state law
instituting a reciprocal beneficiaries system granting some of
the legal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples:
[B]ecause same-sex marriage lacked much public
or elite support, opponents were able to overturn
it, and fairly easily. There was insufficient
pressure from either the public or local or
national elites to implement it. The majority of
the pressure that was brought to bear came from
opponents. Without broad support, there was
nothing the Hawaii courts could do. Litigators
could not overcome the constraints that limit the
ability of courts to produce significant social
16
reform.
Rosenberg acknowledges that the ultimate resolution of
the Vermont marriage case, which after being ordered into the
state legislature led to the passage of a civil unions law without
17
He explains this "mostly positive"'
significant backlash.
outcome as a consequence of Vermont's lesser limitations upon
judicial action, and the fact that the Vermont court did not
order the state legislature to allow same-sex marriage outright,
but left it to the legislature to craft a compromise middle
ground such as civil unions.18
Interestingly, Rosenberg's opinion on the Massachusetts
case, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, seems to have
changed considerably over the last few years, during which he
researched the new chapters for the second edition of The
Hollow Hope. In 2006, Rosenberg declared in a symposium
address that Goodridge was an example of a court decision that
"backfired:" the activists pushing the fight for same-sex
marriages forward had not built a movement that would
persuade the larger population to support their victories and
16

ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 344.

17 Id. at 346.
18

Id. at 347.
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goal, and thus all the case accomplished in the political sphere
was to spark a conservative backlash. 19 He said that the same
sex marriage movement has been "a disaster" because interest
groups did not coordinate their litigation strategies to achieve
their common goal. 20 In The Hollow Hope, however, while he
identifies a national backlash to Goodridge, such as President
Bush calling for a constitutional amendment prohibiting samesex marriage, he acknowledges that there did not seem to be a
21
legislative backlash in Massachusetts following the decision.
Rosenberg identifies a few factors he believes led to the greater
acceptance of the case, such as Massachusetts being a liberal
state compared to the rest of the country and same-sex
22
marriage not requiring any state funding to institute.
Notably, however, in the case of Vermont Rosenberg credits the
Vermont State Supreme Court not ordering that the state
legislature institute same- sex marriage as one factor
contributing to the greater acceptance (and smaller backlash)
within Vermont. In Massachusetts, however, while Goodridge
simply handed the issue to the legislature, the court later sent
the legislature an advisory opinion stating that marriage, not
civil unions or domestic partnerships, was the only remedy that
By
would remove the state constitutional violation.
Rosenberg's own analysis, therefore, Massachusetts also had at
least one factor that should have aggravated the backlash.
A. Choice of Timing
In Rosenberg's conclusion to the new part discussing
same-sex marriage, he assumes that legal activists had
complete independence and control over the timing of the
same-sex marriage lawsuits. Rosenberg summarizes simply
that "activists for same-sex marriage turned to courts too soon
in the reform process. . . . [L]itigation as a method of social
reform is premature."23 In a law review article, Rosenberg
argues that
19 ROSENBERG,
20

supra note 1413, at 812-13.

Id. at 824.

supra note 6, at 349.
Id. at 350-51.
23 ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 416.
21 ROSENBERG,
22
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Same-sex marriage proponents had not built a
successful movement that could persuade their
fellow citizens to support their cause and
pressure political leaders to change the law....
The battle for same-sex marriage would have
been better served if they had never brought
24
litigation, or had lost their cases.
Similarly, Rosenberg asserts in The Hollow Hope,
While I can understand the frustration felt by
advocates of same-sex marriage, succumbing to
the "lure of litigation" seems to have been the
wrong move. . . . By litigating when they did,
proponents of same-sex marriage moved too far
and too fast ahead of the curve, leaping beyond
25
what the American public could bear.
For most lawsuits, it is true that the decision of when to
file was made by the lawyers and clients involved. Because
impact litigation is driven by lawyers, often using test plaintiffs
sought out purely to satisfy the case and controversy
requirement, for many if not most contexts of activist litigation
it would be a fair assumption that the lawyers at activist
organizations conducting the lawsuits chose when to file the

case.
As to same-sex marriage, however, the assumption is
worth questioning.
This may not change the overall
conclusions Rosenberg draws regarding the success of the
litigation-it could be that the choice of timing of litigation was
entirely out of the hands of legal activist organizations, but
that would not alter the assessment of the overall effect of the
litigation. Yet the threshold question of whether the groups
actually chose to commence litigation too early is useful
because it could modify one general inquiry Rosenberg's
arguments ask: '"hen, if at all, should activist groups use
litigation to secure their normative or policy goals?" If his
24
25

ROSENBERG, supranote 14, at 813.
ROSENBERG, supranote 6, at 419.
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assumption that the activist groups are actually the relevant
entity choosing to begin litigation is incorrect, the question
could be modified to "If litigation is commenced, how can
activist groups minimize the damage?"
B. Defining the Goal
Two types of evaluations of the success of the gay
marriage movement are possible. One is to simply say "I define
the gay marriage movement as working toward gay marriage
generally, and will assess the success of the movement
accordingly." The other, which Rosenberg professes to perform,
asks what the goals of the movement as set by the activists are
and compares their accomplishments to their goals:
If the goal is improving the lives of gay men and
lesbians, then there is a good deal to celebrate.
On the other hand, if the goal of the litigation is
marriage equality, then little has been achieved
and major obstacles have been created. . . . In
deciding which viewpoint is more accurate, I look
to the litigants and litigators. Because their selfstated goal is marriage equality, the "one step
forward, two steps back" view more accurately
26
describes the situation.
In this formulation, Rosenberg looks to the broadest
goal of activists and considers that goal to be the motivating
force behind all activism. This goal could be phrased as
"achieve marriage for gays everywhere in the nation." In this
formulation, the finish line is a society that has a stable and
strong commitment to legally sanctioning gay marriage. This
broad goal upon which Rosenberg evaluates the success of the
movement, however, fails to take into account the multiple
groups with different goals involved in the same court cases.
For example, there is the question of the political unit in
which gay marriage is sought to be achieved. The most active
and engaged legal activists doubtless do have a national
26

Id. at 368.
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perspective, but this is not necessarily true of all groups
involved. The cases were almost exclusively brought in state
courts upon claims based in state law, often by state-centric
activist organizations. This suggests that the success of state
activists-as Rosenberg puts it, by "their self-stated goal[s]"should be assessed on a state rather than a national level.
Rosenberg says that the limitations placed on state
courts are larger than the limitations placed on federal
courts.27
For example, state court decisions only hold
precedential value within that state, so any impact of a
decision is limited from the outset.28 Rosenberg also points out
that because state judges do not have lifetime tenure, such
judges have even less judicial independence than federal
judges. 29
Furthermore, Rosenberg argues, the lack of
independent enforcement power is even more limiting for state
court judges, because the lower salience and awareness of state
court decisions mean that elected officials can more safely
ignore state court rulings without ill effects. 30
These
limitations upon state court judges, however, are relevant
because legal activists were fighting not on a national level, in
national courts or even the Supreme Court, but exclusively in
state courts. Rosenberg does not address the question of how
the state-centric nature of the legal claims might change
analysis of the goals and thus success of the movement overall.
Similarly, Rosenberg casts the goal as simply to
"achieve marriage," rather than an intermediate goal such as
supra note 6, at 340.
Id. Rosenberg does not discuss the persuasive power of one state supreme
court's decision on another-most of the same-sex marriage claims are based
in a state constitution's equal protection clause, and because such clauses are
27 ROSENBERG,
28

often extremely similar in may state constitutions, one state supreme court
interpreting the clause may look at the interpretations of other state supreme
courts for background comparison. E.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211
(N.J.,2006); Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 488 (Cal. 2004);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 345 (2003); Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864 (1999). Given the small number of state supreme courts to have
spoken on the question, however, any "soft" persuasive power of this sort is
almost certainly minimal, and Rosenberg is correct that the more important
formal power of precedent is strictly limited.
29 ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 340.
30
Id.
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"move closer to marriage" or even "put same-sex marriage on
For example,
the agenda of gay rights organizations."
Rosenberg repeatedly argues that "if same-sex marriage
proponents had asked only for civil unions rather than
marriage, they might have achieved more." 31 He briefly
addresses the larger question of whether the court cases made
a smaller, more incremental change helping to create "a
climate conducive to significant social reform,"' 32 but argues
that the final conclusion must be no. Despite opinion polls
showing an "unmistakable rise" in public support for civil
unions, 33 Rosenberg attributes the shift in opinion to "a
changing culture"34 and does not believe litigation played a role
in the changing cultural attitudes. This view conflates a
number of different groups that litigation efforts can speak to,
including legal decision makers evaluating the purely legal
arguments, broader society affected by the political argument
accompanying a litigation strategy, and the base of support of
activism that may or may not have considered same-sex
marriage a goal that should be a priority for the overall gay
rights movement. Each of these groups can be spoken to in
different ways, and the goal with regard to each may have been
different. By only asking whether the "self-stated goal" of
"marriage equality" was achieved, Rosenberg may overlook
important ancillary objectives by bundling them all into one
'yes or no" measurement.
C. CoordinatingLegal and PoliticalMovements
According to Rosenberg, while legal activists generally
profess a commitment to a "multi-tiered strategy," they do not
put any such multiprong strategy in place, thus leading to the
movement becoming "a disaster."35 Rosenberg argues that the
legal campaigns for same-sex marriage have completely failed
to take the larger picture, particularly political context, into
account. He argues, "Forgetting the lessons of history, the
31 Id. at
32 Id. at
33

417.
355.

Id. at 405.
34 Id. at 415.
35 ROSENBERG, supra note 14, at 818, 824.
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Progressive agenda was hijacked by a group of elite, welleducated and comparatively wealthy lawyers who uncritically
believed that rights trump politics and that successfully
arguing before judges is equivalent to building and sustaining
political movements." 36 Of progressive lawyers fighting for
same-sex marriage, Rosenberg says,
One of the responses I often hear from
progressive lawyers is . . . 'Well, of course we are
more sophisticated. This is part of a multi-tiered
strategy.' And I say, 'Oh. Well, that's interesting.
What have you been doing on the rest of the
strategy? What part of your budget goes to this?'
And they respond: 'We are really not doing much
now, but we are depending on other people.' So I
do not believe it.
Rosenberg argues that legal activists have failed utterly
to create a meaningful multi-tiered strategy. He does not seem
to recognize any method of considering the political sphere
other than direct organization aimed at legislatures and public
opinion. For example, in a symposium in 2006, he argued:
[H]ere is the point: If you're litigating, you
cannot rely on the hope that there are going to be
other groups having other strategies. if that is
your theory, you've got to coordinate; otherwise
you end up with the same-sex marriage
situation, which I think has been a disaster.... I
remember about ten years ago having a very
heated discussion with Evan Wolfson, one of the
main litigators. And he went on and on about
how litigation is a last resort. We have to have a
whole strategy, we have to invest most of our

Id. at 797.
37 Id. at 818.
36

16
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resources, and he hasn't done any of that. All he's
38
done is litigate with disastrous results.
Rosenberg further does not seem to recognize any
meaningful differences in the amount of political organizing
that accompanies later court cases as opposed to the earliestin other words, whether the energy devoted to the multi-tiered
strategy has increased over time.
For example, while
Rosenberg recognizes that the backlash to Vermont's same-sex
marriage decision was significantly less than in other states
and the work of the activists more successful, he attributes the
success of gay marriage proponents solely to the greater powers
of Vermont state courts and the moderate remedy required by
the court's decision in Baker v. State.39 He does not analyze the
better planning by legal activists as a factor in their efforts.
PART II -ATTRIBUTING CHOICE AND THE DECISION TO LITIGATE
This Part addresses the ability of legal activists fighting
for same-sex marriage to independently decide when to bring
lawsuits. As described in Part I, Rosenberg claims that the
premature filing of lawsuits, as opposed to political action in
legislatures or efforts to create more popular support for gay
marriage, is a major reason why the litigation campaigns have
not been successful. He further asserts that this untimely
beginning to the litigation campaigns was an error in judgment
of the lawyers involved as they "succumb[ed]" to the "lure of
litigation" rather than waiting until the social and political
conditions were better suited. 40 In this Part, this claim will be
tested, to ask whether the legal activists fighting for same-sex
marriage actually succumbed themselves, or whether they had
less choice in the matter of timing.

38

Id. at 824.

39 ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 347.
40

Id. at 419.

2009

EVALUATING LEGAL ACTIVIM

A. The Broader Context: Gay Legal Activism
In order to analyze the position of the legal activist
organizations involved in the fight over gay marriage, it is
helpful to understand the broader context of how gay legal
activist organizations developed and how they fit into the gay
activist community generally. Most simply, litigation-oriented
gay rights activist organizations were extremely slow to
develop, and were often supplemented by action by private
citizens who acted without coordination or consultation with
activist groups.
The genesis of gay rights legal organizations
supplementing the work of groups focused on political and
social activism was marked by hesitation and delay. Other
progressive legal organizations were unwilling to take on gay
rights cases and causes until well after the gay rights
movement had begun. For example, the ACLU issued a policy
statement in 1957 affirmatively arguing that statutes
outlawing sodomy were constitutional.
The ACLU also
supported discriminatory laws and actions such as federal
regulations that banned homosexuals in the civil service. The
ACLU spent a full decade on the conservative side of the gay
rights issue, before beginning in the late 1960s to take a very
small number of cases advocating for the rights of gay
41
Americans.
The first legal organization devoted to the rights of
homosexuals, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
was founded by an attorney named Bill Thom. He filed the
initial paperwork to obtain formal recognition for the group in
1972, thinking that the application would be a swift and rote
approval-he had simply taken the application of a recently
approved organization and replaced the relevant characteristic
with "homosexual." His application, however, was denied, and
he had to appeal to the highest New York state court over a
period of 18 months to successfully charter the organization. 4 2
Even as Thom acted, other activists had already begun
legal action in pursuit of gay rights. In the absence of a
41
42

ANDERSEN, supra note 1, at 18-19.
Id. at 1-2.
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centralized organization, individuals started striking out on
their own. Indeed, the first lawsuit asserting a right to gay
marriage was filed even before any legal activist organizations
devoted to gay rights existed.
In 1970, Jack Baker, the leader of a student group at
the University of Minnesota called Fight Repression of Erotic
Expression (FREE), the first gay-rights college student
organization in the country, applied for a marriage license with
his partner Mike McConnell. 43 The two appealed the decision
to refuse them a license ultimately to the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, but the court did not seem to find the issue a
thorny one. In a perfunctory opinion, the court held that it was
"unrealistic to think" that the term marriage could possibly
mean anything other than the union of one man and one
woman. 44 The Supreme Court of the United States rejected
hearing an appeal that decision for "want of substantial federal
45
question" a few months later.
Baker and McConnell did not appear to have put
significant thought into larger activist goals or strategy as to
their application. Baker was a high-profile gay activist-he
became the first openly gay student body president in 1971, led
by campaign posters featuring a photo of him in a business suit
and high-heeled pumps-but FREE had goals much broader
(and arguably more basic) than focusing on same-sex
marriage. 46 Indeed, Baker and McConnell's goals may have
been more simply personal than political, as the two went to
another county after the Minnesota decision, quietly secured a
marriage license using Baker's gender-neutral legal first name
"Pat," and held a marriage ceremony which they still claim
47
should be recognized as legally valid.
Adding another wrinkle to their litigation "strategy,"
and bolstering the conclusion that they were focused only on
securing legal recognition of their specific relationship rather
than any widespread political and social change, after the
43 MOATS, supra note 11, at 39-40.
44 Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311 (1971).
45 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1971).
46

MOATS, supra note 11, at 40.

47 Doug Grow,

2B.

Gay-MarriagePioneers,Again, STAR TRIBUNE, May 20, 2004, at
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Minnesota decision but before their second marriage license
48
application Michael McConnell legally adopted Jack Baker.
Thus, at the time of their second marriage license application,
Baker and McConnell were, in a strictly legal sense, applying
for a marriage license between a father and son. This can be
almost certainly be taken as conclusive evidence that the two
were not concerned with the larger social and political
messages in their action, as it seems inconceivable that an
activist with any concern for the political appeal of his actions
would not go out of his way to introduce incest into his claims!
It is clear from the timing and from the execution of their legal
activity, in any case, that Baker and McConnell had no
litigation campaign behind them: they were simply two
individuals choosing for personal reasons to use the courts as a
means of securing a single marriage license.
B. Hawaii: ForcingLambda's Hand
By the 1990s, many activist legal organizations fighting
for gay rights had been created, and Lambda Legal had become
the leading group fighting for equality for gay Americans. A
consensus as to whether marriage should be a primary
objective, however, did not yet exist. In the late 1980s, a
number of gay rights organizations-Lambda Legal, Gay &
Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), National Gay Rights
Advocates, and the Lesbian Rights Project-joined informally
in what members called "the Roundtable" to discuss whether
gay rights groups should consider adding same-sex marriage to
their agendas. Many activists felt strongly that it would not be
a good idea to begin agitating for same-sex marriage. Indeed,
one early participant described marriage as "one of the very
few things over which people really fought."49 As of the early
1990s, the organizations could not reach agreement regarding
the issue, and had not resolved to take any action in pursuit of
same-sex marriage. A small group of gay couples in Hawaii,
however, had different plans.
48

Id. Jack Baker's legal name at the time of the second marriage license
application was Pat Lyn McConnell.
49
PINELLO, supra note 4, at 24.
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In the early 1990s, a small group of gay Hawaiians
decided independently, without consultation or input from legal
activist organizations, to try to secure their right to marry
through the courts. Three couples, along with a few local
supporters, contacted Evan Wolfson at Lambda Legal to
inquire whether he would be willing to represent them through
Lambda in a suit for marriage rights. Wolfson brought the
matter to Lambda, and the leadership of the group had an
intense internal debate about whether they should take the
case. Lambda ultimately declined to represent the couples for
two reasons: first, they still were not sure whether same-sex
marriage was a goal that Lambda and other such groups
should begin working towards; and second, they thought
regardless of whether marriage was a worthy goal, the case
would immediately lose in court. Lambda informed the couples
that they declined to represent them, and the couples
ultimately retained a local private lawyer. The lawyer had
previously worked at the Hawaii branch of the American Civil
Liberties Union, so had ties to local public interest groups, but
was not working for such an organization at the time, nor did
he formally conference with or otherwise plan any larger
strategies alongside public interest organizations. So far as he
conducted his own cases, he was entirely on his own. The only
link to any gay rights organization in the early phase of the
case, therefore, was Evan Wolfson, who had taken a personal
interest in the outcome of the case and the couples who had
sought him out. He therefore kept in informal contact with the
plaintiffs and in the process of keeping in touch occasionally
discussed the case with them and engaged in some very ad hoc
brainstorming. A side benefit of his personal interest, as he
described it later, was to ensure that Lambda-while not
involved in the case whatsoever-was aware, at least in a small
sense, of what was happening in the case and whether it might
have any consequences for their own work. 50
To the shock of Lambda Legal, which thought the case
would be quickly disposed of and disappear, the case was taken
up on appeal by the Hawaii state supreme court. Lambda was
thus faced with the most high-profile gay rights case in recent
50 Id. at 25.
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memory in Hawaii moving into the state supreme court with or
without them. The unexpected success of the plaintiffs forced
Lambda's hand. The discussion among Lambda's staffers
debating whether to take the case themselves had been a
contentious one, feeding into a larger disagreement about
whether to pursue same-sex marriage as one of the goals of
Lambda's larger work. 51 Declining to represent the plaintiffs in
the case that became Baehr v. Lewin was not meant to be a
final resolution against pursuing same-sex marriage, but to
merely put off the larger issue by not getting involved with
what the Lambda attorneys expected to be, like the Minnesota
and Kentucky cases from the 1970s, effectively a nonstarter.
Once the case reached the Hawaii Supreme Court,
however, it was apparent to all the attorneys at Lambda that
"the stakes had become too high for Lambda to ignore."52 To
the extent Lambda could get involved at this point, it was
playing catch-up. It had not been involved in the initial filing
of the case, and had it been up to Lambda entirely, the case
would not have been filed at all. But once the case was filed,
and the Hawaii Supreme Court expressed a desire to decide the
issue, Lambda felt it would be an even worse mistake to let the
case be decided by the state supreme court without any input
from the few organized legal gay rights groups in Hawaii.
Lambda thus filed an amicus brief with the court, and
eventually became lead counsel.
C. Vermont: Town Hall Call for Action
In the 1990s Vermont had one small but active gay
rights organization, the Vermont Coalition for Lesbian & Gay
Rights (VCLGR). The state of Vermont has a long tradition of
"town hall" type meetings, and VCLGR frequently held such
open meetings for members to discuss various issues that
might become goals for future action. Following Baehr, the
VCLGR leadership held two such meetings to discuss same-sex
marriage, but attendance and interest in the issue was
extremely low, so the organization concluded same-sex
51 ANDERSEN, supra note 1, at 52-53.
52 Id.ANDERSEN, supra note 1, at 53.
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marriage was not a priority for Vermonters and decided not to

devote staff time or effort to the topic. In the fall of 1995,
however, another open meeting was heavily attended by
VCLGR members who expressed strong desires to begin
working on a same-sex marriage movement. 53 VCLGR was
open to the possibility, unlike Lambda Legal had been, but took
no independent action until its membership made it clear that
there was a grassroots swell of support behind such activism.
At the very end of 1995, interested activists from within
VCLGR created the Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force to
strategize and supervise further activism.5 4 Attorneys ready to
take on a test case, planning for the public relations and
political aspects of a court case, specifically sought out test
plaintiffs who would create a publicity-ready face for the
litigation campaign and embody different possibilities of what
same-sex couples looked like. The three couples who became
the plaintiffs in Baker v. State suited the purpose perfectly: one
male, one young female, and one older female couple.5 5 The
Vermont activists also reached out to other progressive groups
across the country, both to take advantage of other lawyers'
experiences and to think through the consequences of litigation
both inside and outside of Vermont.
It therefore is fair to say that VCLGR, the gay rights
organization in Vermont, had a reasonable amount of control
over the filing of their lawsuit, although the VCLGR leadership
did not act until a significant number of their members called
for such action.
D. Massachusetts:Litigation as Defense
In Massachusetts, in contrast to both Hawaii and
Vermont, the first mover on the question of same-sex marriage
was the conservative side. In response to the court victories in
Hawaii and Vermont, conservatives in Massachusetts began a
political movement to amend the Massachusetts state
Susan M. Murray & Beth Robinson, Laying the Groundwork: Early
Organizing in Vermont, in 3 DEFENDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE FREEDOMTO-MARRY MOVEMENT 36 (Martin Dupuis & William A. Thompson eds., 2007).
54 Id. at 37; see also MOATS, supra note 11, at 100.
55 MOATS, supra note 11, at 106.
53
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constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage; part of the national
backlash Rosenberg discusses as such a disaster for supporters
of equal rights for gays. The battle in Massachusetts thus not
only began in the political sphere rather than the courts, but
the force behind the activism came from the other side.
Importantly, gay activists in Massachusetts felt that
they were losing in the political sphere. The liberal political
leadership resisted conservative attempts to write a prohibition
of same-sex marriage into the state constitution, but only
through aggressive and calculated strategizing. For example,
at the 2002 state constitutional convention, the same-sex
marriage
prohibition
had
enough
signatures
from
Massachusetts voters to be acted upon by legislators and move
into the formal amendment process. The Senate President,
however, arranged to call upon a sympathetic colleague as the
first order of business, having prearranged that the colleague
would move to adjourn the convention, and Democrats would
then vote to adjourn without having held any substantive
discussion or votes on any constitutional amendments. 56 The
scheme worked as planned, and state Democrats held together
to adjourn the convention rather than potentially lose a vote on
the issue of gay marriage.
In response to the conservative political action and the
success of previous legal cases dealing with gay rights issues,
GLAD decided to counter in the court and began putting
EugeL ,er a 'egal case similar to those in Hawai and Vermont.
As in Vermont, GLAD sought out test plaintiffs, selecting seven
couples who would present a sympathetic array. 57 GLAD filed
the case in April 2001, suing the Department of Public Health
for refusing to direct the county clerks to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. 58 The lawsuit in Massachusetts,
therefore, was filed only as a response to conservative activism.
GLAD therefore had little choice in the timing of the lawsuit,
except to the extent that they could have refused to file. The
political fight was in full swing, however, so it seems

56 MURRAY

57
58

& ROBINSON, supra note 53, at 36.

Id. at 41.

Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 314 (2003).
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unrealistic that GLAD could have refused to assist political

activists in a battle already in progress.
E. Oregon: LitigationBrought by County Government
In Oregon, the fight over same-sex marriage began with
sustained pressure by a number of same-sex local couples on
the gay rights group Basic Rights Oregon, asking the
organization to begin fighting for same-sex marriage. 59 Roey
Thorpe, the Executive Director of Basic Rights Oregon, decided
to take the suggestions of the group's members, but decided to
pursue the argument by lobbying local government officials
rather than filing a lawsuit, and to make the legal arguments
directly to them rather than to a court. Thus, Thorpe met with
two liberal Multnomah County commissioners and argued that,
along the lines of the state constitutional arguments that had
prevailed in Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts, the Oregon
state constitution might mandate that marriage licenses be
issued to same-sex couples. The commissioners then asked
Agnes Sowle, the county attorney, for her official evaluation of
the county's legal position and whether the argument Thorpe
put forward was valid.
Sowle was already aware of the cases in the other
states, so had previously conducted some superficial research of
the legal question as it would apply to Oregon state law and
tentatively concluded that the county would be acting
unconstitutionally to deny same-sex couples the right to
marry.6° As Sowle conducted further research, the pressure
from local citizens began to increase: a few gay couples, spurred
in part by San Francisco having started issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples two weeks before,6 1 had formally
requested marriage licenses from the clerk's office. Their
request had been denied, and it appeared that they might be
preparing to file their own lawsuit. The Multnomah County
chairwoman thus swiftly officially accepted Sowle's legal

59

David Austin, Tom Hallman, Jr., & Scott Learn, The Marriage Brokers,

SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Mar. 7, 2004, at Al.
60 Austin ET AL., supra note 59, at Al.
61 PINELLO,

supra note 4, at 107.
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opinion as to the county's legal obligations after Sowle sent it to
her, and as of March 3 the clerk's office began issuing marriage
62
licenses to same-sex couples.
After securing the licenses and holding ceremonies,
however, the couples had to forward their documents to the
State Registrar for the state's records of marriages. The
registrar's office disagreed with Sowle's opinion regarding the
state constitution versus statutes, and refused to register the
documentation of the same-sex marriages. 63 In response, a
lawsuit was filed against the state by Multnomah County
itself, along with nine same-sex couples, Basic Rights Oregon,
64
and the ACLU.
The action in Oregon was therefore not begun through
the courts.
Multnomah County began issuing same-sex
marriage licenses as the result of a lobbying effort by Basic
Rights Oregon. The case moved into the courts only after the
local and state governments clashed, and the lawsuit was itself
filed by Multnomah County. The legal activist organizations in
Oregon therefore did not actually make the decision to litigate.
F. New Jersey: Dual Politicaland Legal Action
From the beginning of efforts in pursuit of same-sex
marriage in New Jersey, political and legal activist efforts were
intertwined.
For example, five gay professors at Rutgers
University filed suit in 1997 arguing that they should be given
the same legal rights with respect to their partners as married
heterosexual couples were given. 65 The suit failed, but sparked
some increased lobbying activity around legal recognition of
same-sex relationships.
This lobbying in turn affected
Lambda's internal discussions prior to early 2002 whether to
file a new lawsuit patterned after the successful cases in other
states.
As legal activists debated this possibility, the
organization planned explicitly to "complement the work
62 Austin ET AL.,

supranote 59, at Al.

63

Li v. State, 110 P.3d. 91, 94 (Or. 2004).

64

Id.

65

Laura E. Pople, Grassroots Organizing:Lessons from the Garden State, in 3
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52-53, supra note 53, at 51, 56. (Martin
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already being done in the state and to work with local entities

in doing so."66
Oddly, the carefully crafted dual-track activism initially
created precisely the opposite result as in other states. In the
trial court, Lambda Legal lost; the court rejected its claims that
of same-sex
state law
mandated legal recognition
67
relationships. Only two months later, however, as the appeal
to the trial court's decision was still pending, the state
legislature passed and the governor swiftly signed into law a
statute creating domestic partnerships. 68 The law granted a
limited set of rights to same-sex domestic partners; less than
the civil unions of Vermont but more than the reciprocal
beneficiaries of Hawaii. 69 Despite the domestic partnership
law, however, Lambda Legal pressed forward with its appeal to
its trial court defeat, which resulted in a decision that
eventually secured the right to civil unions, which provided
even more protections and rights than the extant domestic
partnerships.
As in Vermont, therefore, the activists in New Jersey
did have at least some control over the filing of their lawsuit,
although their strategy was so integrated with the
simultaneous political actions that the legal activists were not
acting entirely independently.
F California
In February 2004, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom
engaged in an "historic act of civil disobedience" and ordered
the clerk's office to begin sanctioning gay marriages. 70 The
California state laws were clear; while in 1999 the state
66 Id.

See Lewis v. Harris, 378 N.J. Super. Cr. App. Div. 259, 263 (2005). The
trial court's opinion was unpublished.
68 Pople, supra note 65, at 55.
69 David M. Stauss, Note, The End or Just the Beginning for Gay Rights
under the New Jersey Constitution?: The New Jersey Domestic Partnership
Act, Lewis v. Harris, and the Future of Gay Rights in New Jersey, 36 RUTGERS
L.J. 289, 306-307 (2004).
70 Rachel Gordon, S.F. Defies Law, Marries Gays, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 2004,
at Al.
67
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legislature passed a domestic partnership bill into law, in 2000
California voters passed Proposition 22, also known as the
Knight Initiative, specifying that marriage was only between a
man and a woman. 71 Newsom explained his actions, made only
one month after he took office, as the consequence of his oath to
uphold California's constitution at his inauguration: he argued
that to deny same-sex couples the right to marry violated the
72
California state constitution.
Newsom's order did not stand for very long: two
conservative groups filed suit to secure injunctions halting the
marriages within hours of the first license being issued, 73 and
within a month the marriages stopped under court order. 74 In
August, the Supreme Court of California made a ruling on the
merits and made the injunction permanent, ruling that until
courts determined that it was a violation of the California state
constitution to issue marriage licenses only to heterosexuals,
the county clerk and Mayor had to follow the marriage statutes
as written. 75 The court's opinion further specified that the
marriage licenses that had been issued had no legal
significance. 76 It did note that its opinion did not "reflect any
view" on the issue of "the substantive question of the
constitutional validity of California's statutory provisions
limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman."77
The City and County of San Francisco then filed an
action, along with several same-sex couples who had been
married following Newsom's order as well as activist
organizations, raising the substantive issues that the court
said were not before it in the case evaluating the propriety of
Newsom's order itself.78 As in Oregon, the court battle became
supra note 4, at 95.
Rachel Gordon, Newsom's Plan for Same-Sex Marriages,S.F. CHRON., Feb.
11, 2004, at Al.
73 Harriet Chiang, Rachel Gordon, & Steve Rubenstein, Mad Dash to S.F.
City Hall to Say 'I Do,'S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2004, at Al.
74 Bob Egelko, Court Halts Gay Vows, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2004, at Al.
75 Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (2004).
76 Dean Murphy, California Court Rules Gay Unions Have No Standing, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at Al.
77 Lockyer, 33 Cal. 4th at 1069.
78 In
re Marriage Cases, S147999, May 15, 2008, available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/Sl47999.PDF.
71 PINELLO,
72
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one between different units of government, local versus state.
Yet unlike Oregon, gay rights organizations had no part in the
actions leading to the litigation, as they had not been involved
in Newsom's decision to order the clerk's office to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. At the point at which
the City and County as well as private citizens were filing
lawsuits, therefore, gay rights organizations were in a similar
position as Lambda Legal was in Hawaii, as the case would
move forward whether they were involved or not.
G. Conclusions
Rosenberg's claim that lawyers conducting litigation in
pursuit of same-sex marriage made erroneous affirmative
choices as to the timing of their cases is revealed as only
partially accurate. In Hawaii, Lambda Legal had actually
chosen not to represent the plaintiffs and not to be involved in
the litigation whatsoever. It was only once the plaintiffs,
represented by an independent attorney, reached the state
supreme court that Lambda Legal made the choice to become
directly involved in the litigation, already in progress. As
Lambda Legal entered the case, moreover, their choice was not
whether or not to pursue the appeal-the appeal to the Hawaii
Supreme Court was going forward with or without them. The
question was only whether a case with the potential to affect
the rights of gay Hawaiians would be conducted entirely
independently by a private attorney or with the assistance of a
prominent gay rights public interest legal organization. This
clearly is not the choice Rosenberg is concerned with when
asking whether same-sex marriage litigation was filed too soon.
In Vermont, the efforts of activist groups were driven by
pressure from private citizens. The case is not so stark as in
Hawaii-private citizens had not actually sought out their own
private representation and filed lawsuits-but the pressure of
their actions is important nonetheless. The membership of the
VCLGR showed intense interest in the prospect of working
It is true that the VCLGR
toward same-sex marriage.
leadership could possibly have gone to their members and
explained that they did not believe the time was ripe for such a
campaign, but given the intense interest and the utility of
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continuing a recent and successful campaign in support of gay
adoption rights to another measure protecting the rights of gay
families, it is clear that the legal activists faced considerable
pressures and incentives pushing them toward filing a test
lawsuit.
In Massachusetts, the conservative opponents to samesex marriage moved first, by attempting to pass an amendment
to the state constitution prohibiting same-sex marriage
entirely.
After one attempt was derailed by procedural
maneuvering, supporters of same-sex marriage knew that
conservative political efforts were being met with some
success-while the liberals had successfully blocked the first
amendment attempt, conservatives would no doubt again
obtain the required number of signatures to make a second
attempt at constitutional amendment. As they countered the
political action, therefore, filing a lawsuit in an attempt to open
up a second and potentially more sympathetic front was a
natural choice. After all, the court case had the potential to
derail the political amendment effort no matter its resolution:
if the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that there was no
right to same-sex marriage or recognition of same-sex
relationships, why would conservatives need to pass a
constitutional amendment saying so? Even a loss in court
would deflate the political movement, and might prevent the
harm of a strongly-worded amendment prohibiting all legal
recognition of same-sex relationships rather than only
prohibiting same-sex marriage per se.
In Oregon, the legal activists initially chose to lobby
local government rather than file a court case. The lawsuit
was filed by Multnomah County only after the state
government refused to recognize marriage licenses issued to
same-sex couples. Similarly, in California a maverick political
leader took matters into his own hands, and generated a legal
dispute as to the propriety of his actions as well as the
underlying issue of same-sex marriage under the California
state constitution.
At that point, groups in Oregon and
California were confronted with the same situation as Lambda
in Hawaii: the case was moving forward with or without them.
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Of the campaigns Rosenberg discusses, the only state in
which activists truly had full agency of whether and when to
file a lawsuit was New Jersey. Probably not coincidentally,
New Jersey is also the state in which the legal and political
lobbying efforts were most integrated and supportive. As
discussed above, the New Jersey chapter of Lambda Legal
consciously chose to file a lawsuit to "complement the [political]
work already being done in the state."79 The political and legal
efforts
worked
simultaneously
and
complementarily
throughout, as legal and political resolutions alternated.
It thus appears that Rosenberg's claim that legal
activists chose to file too soon is not accurate. For the most
part, legal activists did not choose to file at all-certainly in
Hawaii, they had no choice in the timing of the case. In all but
one of the other state same-sex marriage litigation battles, the
decision of when to file was greatly influenced by other factors.
The claim that legal activists resolved to file lawsuits at an
inappropriately premature time, therefore, is not true.
PART III - THE WRONG GOAL
As discussed in Part I, Rosenberg conceives of the goals
of same-sex marriage activists as "marriage equality."8 0 I have
spelled out what Rosenberg considers the components of
marriage equality, for ease of analysis, as "to achieve marriage
for gays everywhere in the nation." This Part will assess
whether the goals of same-sex marriage activists can be
summarized in this binary of whether same-sex marriage was
achieved. The evaluation of the accuracy of the goal will be
provided in two Sections, questioning both whether marriage
equality is an appropriate finish line ("achieve marriage for
gays") and whether tallying the state of legal recognition of
same-sex relationships nationwide is an appropriate measure
of marriage equality ("everywhere in the nation").

79 Pople, supra note 65, at 56.

80 ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 368.
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A. "Achieve Marriagefor Gays"
In evaluating the success of the movement for same-sex
marriage, Rosenberg argues that partial progress is not a
victory:
If the goal is improving the lives of gay men and
lesbians, then there is a good deal to celebrate.
On the other hand, if the goal of the litigation is
marriage equality, then little has been achieved
and major obstacles have been created. . . . In
deciding which viewpoint is more accurate, I look
to the litigants and litigators. Because their selfstated goal is marriage equality, the 'one step
forward, two steps back' view more accurately
81
describes the situation.
1. Is There Only One Goal?
A threshold question to the general inquiry of whether
gay activists have succeeded in attaining same-sex marriage is
whether the same-sex marriage movement can be understood
to have a single identifiable goal. Rather than simply working
toward achieving gay marriage legally, different groups within
the movement may have different goals speaking to different
elnitiue,
expressing different messages, and performing
different functions.
Rosenberg argues that the initial victories in same-sex
marriage litigation awakened a considerable backlash from
opponents to gay marriage. He is correct to have identified the
opponents as one group that paid attention to the same-sex
marriage cases, but he overlooks the other groups also affected.
As such a case is filed, it speaks simultaneously to several
different groups, and in order to be successful must convey a
different message to each.
The most obvious, first-level
message a case must express is a legal argument to the legal
elites actually ruling on the litigation. Second, such cases
speak to the activist base of support of the organizations
81 Id.
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conducting the litigation, and in the case of same-sex marriage,
invested individuals often used litigation as a way of forcing
same-sex marriage onto the agenda of legal activist
organizations. The case should convey a more popular-a
nonlegal-message to the broader public who will read about
the case, but not be familiar with or be persuaded by the
doctrinal legal arguments. Finally, the case will express a
message to its core opponents. Each of these messages can
have different goals as well as different messages and
strategies.
a. Arguments to the Legal Elites
The process of choosing legal arguments is, even apart
from any political concerns, one of careful strategy. Ellen Ann
Andersen explains how litigators must draw their arguments
from an array of viable possibilities: ....they must articulate
their claims so that they fall within the categories previously
established by an amalgam of constitutional, statutory,
administrative, common, and case law."8 2 A lawyer, in other
words, may not simply make the argument he believes to be
true. Most litigators arguing that protection of equal rights
enshrined in state constitutions, for example, undoubtedly
believe that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution signifies equality of gay
and lesbian Americans, no matter what the Supreme Court
says. The work of a lawyer, however, is very different than the
work of a judge, and thus the lawyer must pick and choose her
arguments from what she evaluates to be viable legal claims.
Note that this does not mean the lawyer must choose
her arguments solely from what is currently accepted legal
doctrine. If that were so, legal activism would be impossible.
Rather, the most challenging skill for an activist lawyer is
anticipating what doctrinal shifts a court will be hospitable to,
and presenting that court with an argument persuasive enough
to shift them a step or two in the direction the lawyer desires.
For an activist lawyer thinking only of the courtroom,
this process might counsel aggressive legal arguments and
82
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strategies. Such singleminded determination can be seen in
the case of Jack Baker of Minnesota discussed above, who
simultaneously argued that his marriage license obtained
using gender-neutral first names should be considered valid by
the government and arranged for his partner to legally adopt
him in order to attain some universally-accepted legal status.8 3
His legal arguments may have been sincere, if too far of a
stretch for the court to accept-but the adoption proceeding
meant that he was arguing for governmental recognition of a
relationship that was, at least in technical terms, incestuous.
In contrast, the modern lawsuits kept multiple
audiences and purposes in mind. The arguments based in
state law were calculated to succeed, as federal constitutional
claims were clear losers. After Baehr proved the success of a
claim based in the state constitution, later groups generally
patterned their arguments after its winning template.
Stuart Scheingold argues that casting social and
political goals in terms of legal rights gives greater legitimacy
to the goals, because the concept of rights connotes entitlement
to those rights. Rights in the public mind, he argues, mean
fairness and justice, rather than simply governmental
largesse.8 4 It is important, therefore, that the suits for samesex marriage were crafted in the language of equal rights. The
work of the lawyer, therefore, is trying to cast the right to
same-sex marriage as a broad right rather than a narrow one.
This was a primary dynamic in the shift from Bowers v.
Hardwick to Lawrence v. Texas: the right at stake was defined
very differently in each case. In Bowers, homosexuals not
being criminally prosecuted for sexual activity taking place in
the privacy of their own bedroom was described as the right to
sodomy.8 5 By contrast, in Lawrence, the same right was
described as a general right to privacy.8 6 How narrowly a right
83

See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.

84 STUART

A.

SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,

AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
85 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) ('The issue presented is
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy ...").
86 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) ('We conclude the case should
be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to
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is drawn therefore influences whether a court accepts the right
as established and whether society considers the right to be an
entitlement or a special privilege.
The litigation in Hawaii established the pattern which
later cases in pursuit of same-sex marriage would follow. The
case Bowers v. Hardwick,8 7 issued seven years before, had
rejected claims to gay rights based in the Fourteenth
Amendment: the decision characterized a gay man's challenge
to Georgia's statute prohibiting sodomy as asserting a
"fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,"8 8 and
roundly rejected any such right. The case did not deal with gay
marriage in any way, but it was clear that if sodomy
prohibitions were deemed constitutional, prohibitions of samesex marriage similarly would be upheld. The Baehr plaintiffs
therefore grounded their legal claims in the Hawaii state
constitution rather than the federal constitution, claiming that
denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated their
right to privacy and equal protection under the Hawaii state
89
constitution.
The goal of the lawyers in such cases, therefore, is not
simply "to achieve marriage for gays," although that was
certainly part of their motivation. The message as expressed in
legal terms means that the goal is not simply the policy result
that same-sex marriage was recognized in law, but that courts
recognized a legal right of gays and lesbians to receive
recognition of their intimate relationships in the same way that
heterosexual relationships were recognized by the government.
Evaluating whether a legal right was recognized therefore
changes the evaluation: while same-sex marriage outright was
not accomplished in states other than Massachusetts and
California, all the other states discussed above did recognize a
legal right to legal recognition of homosexual relationships.
From the point of view of the legal message, the goal-establish

engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment to the Constitution.").
87 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186.
88
Id. at 191.
89 Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 539-40 (1993).
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a right to legally-sanctioned homosexual relationships-is both
different and was more fully realized.
b. Arguments to the Base of Support
Another type of message, with accompanying and
different goal, is the communication speaking to an activist
movement's core supporters. The difficult position of Lambda
Legal in Hawaii illustrates the real conflict within the gay
rights movement about whether marriage was-and is-a goal
that the movement as a whole should devote considerable effort
to. A significant number of gay rights activists either did not
want to prioritize marriage or actually opposed seeking gay
marriage rights at all. 90 For example, some activists argue
that "marriage is a rotten institution" that "involves
hierarchies that have systematically subordinated women's
personal, economic and social interests to those of men." 91 For
some gay activists, homosexual relationships "offer unique
possibilities for the construction of egalitarian relationships"
very different than what they conceive heterosexual marriages
to be. 92 Some activists see marriage as a worthy goal, but
simply do not believe that it will realistically be accomplished
in the foreseeable future, and thus activism should focus on
93
more attainable measures.
An activist court case therefore speaks to members of
the activist movement as to how important, how appropriate,
and how achievable a specific goal is. As discussed in Part II,
in many cases the legal activist groups conducting lawsuits had
Rather,
not independently chosen to bring the cases.
individual citizens had forced the issue by beginning their own
independent campaigns. The individual activists taking action
on their own thus not only worked toward achieving same-sex
90 See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay
and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantlethe Legal Structure of Gender in

Every Marriage,"79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).

91 William N. Eskridge, Jr. A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1486 (1993).
JEFFREY WEEKS, BRIAN HEAPHY & CATHERINE DONOVAN, SAME-SEX
INTIMACIES: FAMILIES OF CHOICE AND OTHER LIFE EXPERIMENTS 109 (2001).
93 Tyler & Thayer, supra note 58, at 14-15.
92
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marriage, but successfully pushed same-sex marriage onto the
agenda of gay rights organizations. Their goal was not simply
"achieve marriage for gays," but "make same-sex marriage a
priority for gay rights groups."
In the case of Hawaii, for example, the activists within
Lambda Legal were skeptical of same-sex marriage as a goal
for gay rights organizations. By independently filing the case,
the plaintiffs demonstrated both to the Hawaii Lambda Legal
and other activists across the country that at least one vocal
contingent of gay activists wanted the right to marry very
much, and that their arguments had a chance of succeeding.
The arguments chosen in the course of the litigation
may affect how successful this "preaching to the choir" message
is. For example, Jonathan Rauch has argued repeatedly that
gay marriage would civilize homosexual males. 94
That
argument would likely at best fail to motivate most gay
activists, and at worst anger them and cause them to associate
marriage with hostile judgment and condemnation of
homosexuality.
Casting the argument in terms of rights,
however, makes marriage universal.
Perhaps more
importantly, rights are understood as symbolic affirmations of
the worth and equal value of a particular group, even by group
members with no desire to exercise a particular right. In this
sense, because litigation by necessity is more likely to put
forward broad rights-based arguments rather than pure policy
considerations, litigation may intrinsically make the activist
base more supportive of the goal.
Furthermore, Rosenberg does not acknowledge the
positive effect that a backlash from opponents to same-sex
marriage sometimes has on supporters. As Vermont activists
inspired by the litigation in Hawaii planned their own lawsuit,
for example, the lawyers preparing the case held a screening of
a conservative video made in Hawaii arguing for a state
constitutional amendment prohibiting gay marriage. 95 The
Vermont activists screened the video in order to show their
94 Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse?, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND

A READER 169 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997). Rauch's essay contains the
memorable line, "For taming men, marriage is unmatched." Id. at 177.
95 Murray & Robinson, supra note 53, at 39.
CON:
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supporters "what the opposition was saying about us," as a
means of preparing themselves for likely counterarguments
within Vermont. 96 The activists found that the video inspired
their supporters to further action 9 7-seeing the backlash in one
state provoked more activism in another.
The goal of same-sex marriage litigation is thus also a
message from one subgroup of activists to the larger activist
population. In this sense, moreover, the activists desiring to
make same-sex marriage a priority for the gay rights
movement were overwhelmingly successful, as marriage is one
of the main agenda items for every national gay rights
98
organization.
c. Message to the Public and Opponents
Finally, the broadest message-and broadest goal--of a
litigation campaign is with regard to people uninvolved in the
course of the lawsuits that are not already among the
movement's core. Some members of the public will already be
opposed to the goals of the litigation movement; Americans
across the country who had already firmly decided they were
against same-sex marriage. These people responded to news of
litigation victory in Hawaii by originating the backlash that
Rosenberg found so powerful.
Opponents will be difficult, if not impossible, to win
over. The vast undecided middle of the ideological spectrum,
however, may be convinced-thus the need, as Rosenberg
correctly points out, to complement legal activist campaigns
with politically persuasive activism. In Vermont, for example,
legal activists held speaker's training sessions for lawyers who
would be called upon to discuss the court case to the media,
including the admonition to remember the audience, believing
one-third was already with them, one-third would always

96 Id.

97 Id. at 40.
98
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Human
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Legal.org,
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Law,"
Family
and
Relationships
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oppose them, and to focus on the one-third "winnable middle."99
To the extent that activists have effectively given up on
convincing opponents to support their aims, therefore, the goal
with regard to opponents might well be to minimize their
awareness of the issue.
In these messages to the broadest swathe of Americans,
activists have a goal most similar to Rosenberg's formulation:
convince the "winnable middle" of the desirability of marriage
equality.
It is this belief in the policy goal that makes
Rosenberg's focus "solely . . . the effectiveness of courts in
producing significant social reform."100 Therefore, within the
focus of Rosenberg's work, the standard should be whether the
net effect of the court cases was to improve the lives of gay men
and lesbians, or whether the minds of Americans were changed
to be more in favor of gay rights than before. In this rubric, if
conservative Americans remained conservative, and even if it
led to backlash in states that would never have liberalized
their laws, the litigation campaigns did no harm. Yet if they
contributed to a more permissive attitude and even legislative
structure in other states that were more moderate, then the
litigation campaign achieved measurable goals.
Finally, the message to the general public might be
intentionally made in strong terms as a rhetorical or tactical
strategy, believing that asking for a higher goal such as
marriage will make attainment of an intermediate goal, such
as domestic partnerships or civil unions, easier. Rosenberg
criticizes the pursuit of marriage itself as a tactical error,
stating that "if same-sex marriage proponents had asked only
for civil unions rather than marriage, they might have
achieved more."' 01 Rosenberg seems to imply that asking for
marriage enraged opponents of gay marriage more than asking
for civil unions would have, but he does not offer evidence as to
this point.
Surveys have consistently indicated that there is more
support among Americans for civil unions than for same-sex

99 Murray & Robinson, supra note 53, at 38.
100 RoSENBERG, supra note 6, at 5.
101 Id. at 417.
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marriage. 10 2 For example, the Pew Forum asserts that,
according to a series of surveys, since July 2005 the majority of
Americans support civil unions, while as of August 2007 only
36% of Americans support same-sex marriage. 10 3 To the extent
that more Americans support civil unions than support samesex marriage, therefore, it seems reasonable that by numbers
alone, the issue of gay marriage creates more opponents than
does the prospect of civil unions.
Moving beyond the question of whether civil unions or
same-sex marriage has more supporters, however, when
assessing support for civil unions versus same-sex marriage
survey data indicates that whether both options are on the
table affects the support for civil unions. For example, surveys
by Pew and Gallup indicate that support for civil unions is
higher if a person was first asked their opinion about gay
10 4
marriage than if they were only asked about civil unions.
One analysis summarizes that people are more likely to
support civil unions if they are allowed to first express
opposition to same-sex marriage. 10 5 This comports with the
actual resolutions of several of the marriage lawsuits: state
legislatures passed domestic partnership or civil union schemes
as a compromise between activists demanding marriage on one
side and opponents fighting gay marriage on the other. Court
decisions holding that some sort of relationship recognition was
necessary, but not mandating marriage itself, seemed to have
l02E.g., Support for Civil Unions Rises, Yet Sharp Divisions Remain, ABC
at
available
NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/l05Oa3Sociallssues.pdf ; CNN.com
CNN.com,
2004,
Election
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/statesfUS/P/00/epolls.O.ht
ml;
103 David Masci, A Stable Majority: Most Americans Still Oppose Same-Sex
Marriage,PEW FORUM, April 1, 2008, http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=290.
104 Tonja Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The PoliticalPower of Remedial Delay in
Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY. 11, 32-33 (2006); See Also,
Revisiting Gay Marriage vs. Civil Unions GALLUP, May 11, 2004, http:
www.gallup.com/poll/11662/ Revisiting-Gay-Marriage-vs.-Civil-unions.aspx;
See Also Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition to Homosexuality, PEW
FORUM,, http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=37..

Paul R. Brewer & Clyde Wilcox, Same-Sex marriageand Civil Unions, 69
PUB. OP. Q. 599, 600, 603 (2005).
105
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shifted the playing field in legislatures by making an
intermediate step such as civil unions the moderate position
rather than an extreme progressive flank.
The goal with regard to the general public and
legislatures might therefore be simply some kind of progress,
while the message expressed pushes further. Rosenberg's
claim to assess the goals of the same-sex marriage movement
on their own terms, justifying a binary evaluation of whether
marriage was achieved for same-sex relationships, would
therefore be inaccurate as to the actual goals of the activists.
Their goals could simply be, as Rosenberg evaluates
movements generally, social change.
2. How FarForward?
In addition to the multiplicity of goals, furthermore, a
binary evaluation of whether marriage was achieved or not
does not take into account any progress-in many cases
substantial progress-that was nonetheless short of marriage
outright. A full evaluation of the accuracy of Rosenberg's claim
that same-sex marriage activists have failed should therefore
take a more complete assessment of the results of such
litigation campaigns into account.
a. Hawaii:Reciprocal Beneficiaries,but Backlash
In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii state supreme court held
that while the right to privacy under the Hawaii constitution
did not encompass a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage, 10 6 under the state constitution's equal protection
clause denying marriage to same-sex couples was a
classification on the basis of sex.10 7 Tying the alleged state
constitutional violation to sex rather than sexual orientation
meant that under Hawaii's state constitution, the marriage law
was subjected to strict constitutional scrutiny. 0 8 The court
thus set up an extremely high standard for the government to
106

Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 550 (1993).

107

Id. at 561.

108 ESKRIDGE, supra note 51, at 19.
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meet in defending its denial of marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. The court then remanded the issue to the trial court
to give the state an opportunity to try to meet that high
standard.
Once the case was remanded, news that Hawaii's courts
would soon be forcing the state to solemnize the marriages of
scores of homosexual couples exploded into the media. William
Eskridge described the reaction to the court's decision as an
"apocalyptic sensation," triggering "a stampede to isolate
[Hawaii] and its judiciary."'10 9 Lambda successfully argued in
the trial court that the state could not justify not granting
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 110 but as the court
battles raged on, an immense influx of conservative funding
and manpower successfully lobbied for and passed a state
constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage,' so
the state supreme court subsequently held that the
112
constitutional amendment effectively reversed that decision.
Ironically, one of the measures meant to prevent same-sex
marriage outright provided some measure of protection for
same-sex couples in the wake of the state constitutional
amendment, as the legislature had passed the Reciprocal
Beneficiaries Act in July 1997 in an attempt to demonstrate
that the state did not in fact discriminate on the basis of sex.
The law remained on the books after the constitutional
amendment settled the marriage question with finality,
although it has been gutted of many of the more tangible
rights.
b. Vermont: Civil Unions
The Vermont state supreme court's decision was slightly
less rigid than the Hawaii court's decision in Baehr. Although
the court's precise motivations are unclear, the decision also
seemed conscious of the larger context-and potential
volatility--of the issue. Again the plaintiffs grounded their
109Id. at 26.
110 Baehr v. Miike, 80 Haw. 341 (1996).
I1"Haw. Const. art. I, §23.
112 Baehr v. Miike, 92 Haw. 634 (1999); See Also 1999 Haw. Lexis 391 (1999).
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claims in the Vermont state constitution rather than the

federal constitution, and again the state supreme court found
that under the state constitution, to deny same-sex couples the
"common benefits and protections" of marriage was
discriminatory. 113
Rather than order any specific relief,
however, the court claimed to "suspend[]" its ruling's effect "to
permit the Legislature to consider and enact legislation
consistent with the constitutional mandate described" in the
decision. 114 This delegation to the legislature was startling to
most participants in the litigation-one of the attorneys for the
plaintiffs recalled not even being sure whether they had won or
lost the case at first. 115
After considerable legislative debate, the Vermont
legislature eventually voted to create a civil unions bill, which
was then signed into law by then-Governor Howard Dean.
There was surprisingly little backlash to the law within
Vermont, especially as compared to the furor in Hawaii, and
Vermont continues to provide civil unions today.
c. Massachusetts:Marriage
Again, in Massachusetts the legal arguments in favor of
same-sex marriage won, but as in Vermont, the court delayed
action in order to allow the legislature to act. The court
rejected the government's justifications for limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples, holding that the government had "failed
to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying
civil marriage to same-sex couples.""16 The court remanded the
case back to the trial court in order to enter a judgment
consistent with the supreme court's finding that the
government had not justified restricting marriage licenses to
heterosexual couples, but stayed entry of the judgment for one
hundred eighty days "to permit the Legislature to take such
' 7
action as it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion.""
113 Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 197
114 Id. at 229.
115 MOATS, supra note 11, at 4.
116 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 312.
117 Id. at 344.

(1999).
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Unlike Vermont, however, the legislative discussion was
constrained explicitly by the court's opinion as to what would
ameliorate the state constitutional inequality. Upon request
from the state senate, the court issued an advisory opinion that
specified that an intermediate step, such as domestic
partnerships or civil unions, would still violate the state
constitution, because under such a regime homosexual couples
would be treated differently than heterosexual couples. 118
While the court at least formally gave the issue over to the
state legislature, therefore, the legislature was effectively
bound. The legislature only had the opportunity to deal with
the question for six months before the court's decision went
into effect, and the court further told the legislature that it
would strike down as unconstitutional anything less than
issuing marriage licenses.
In the face of this, the state
legislature did not act, and pursuant to the state supreme
court's judgment, Massachusetts began issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples in May 2004.119
d. New Jersey: Domestic Partnershipsand Civil Unions
As discussed in Section II.F. above, in New Jersey
simultaneous political and legal activism led to a series of
reforms.
As a case filed by Lambda Legal was pending
asserting a right to same-sex marriage, the state legislature
passed a bill creating a system of domestic partnerships. 120 in
2006, Lambda then won its case in the state supreme court. 121
In a close parallel to other such state supreme court victories,
the court held that "denying rights and benefits to committed
same-sex couples that are statutorily given to their
heterosexual counterparts" violated the New Jersey state
constitution. 122 As in previous cases, the court gave the state
legislature an opportunity-180 days-to pass a statute
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 1209-10 (2004).
119 Cece Cox, To Have and to Hold-Or Not: The Influence of the Christian
Right on Gay Marriage Laws in the Netherlands, Canada, and the United
States, 14 L.AW & SEXUALITY 1, 23 (2005).
120 Pople, supra note 65, at 55.
121 Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 423 (2006).
122 Id. at 423.
118
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ameliorating the violation. The court gave more directions to
the legislature than in Vermont, but less than in
Massachusetts. It explicitly noted that the state legislature did
not have to allow same-sex couples to marry, but did specify
requirements such as that civil unions must be as easy to enter
123
into as marriage.
In response, a marriage bill was introduced into the
New Jersey state legislature, but was essentially ignored by
other representatives. 124
Once a civil unions bill was
125
introduced, however, it passed quickly and quietly.
Interestingly, legislators left the domestic partnerships statute
in effect, probably because domestic partnerships were also
1 26
open to heterosexual partners if over the age of sixty-two.
Thus, New Jersey now offers a limited spectrum of legallyrecognized relationships: domestic partnerships, providing
"some, but not all of the rights and obligations of marriage" to
same-sex and elderly heterosexual couples, civil unions
providing "substantially all of the rights and benefits of
marriage" to same-sex couples, and marriage to heterosexual
couples.127

e. Oregon: Legal Defeat, Political Victory
In Oregon, Multnomah County asserting its right to
issue marriage licenses won in the trial court and the case was
appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court. The fight then began
123

Id. at 463.

124 Thomas Hoff Prol, New Jersey's Civil Unions Law: A

Constitutional
"Equal"Creates Inequality, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 169, 178 (2007).
125 See N.J. Lawmakers OK Civil Unions, Not Same-Sex Marriage,CNN.COM,
Dec.
14,
2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/12/14/same.sex/index.html.
126 Joanna Grossman, The New Jersey Domestic PartnershipLaw: Its Formal
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples, and How It Differs from Other States'
Approaches,
FINDLAW.CoM,
Jan.
13,
2004,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20040113.html.
The law included
elderly heterosexual couples on the theory that elderly citizens sometimes
choose not to marry because of how marriage would affect their pension,
Social Security, or other such retirement plans. Id.
127 Op. N.J. Att'y Gen., No. 3-2007 (Feb. 16, 2007) at 2, available at
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleasesO7/ag-formal-opinion-2.16.07.pdf.
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on two fronts, as the Oregon Defense of Marriage Coalition,
which had intervened to become a party in the litigation,
simultaneously sponsored Measure 36,128 an amendment to the
Oregon state constitution prohibiting same-sex marriage that
was passed by voters during the pendency of the Oregon
Supreme Court appeal. 129 The Oregon Supreme Court then
issued a ruling finding that the marriage licenses issued before
the amendment were not issued pursuant to state law, and
that the amendment firmly settled the question against
permitting same-sex marriage for the future. 130
In an
interesting recent twist however, in early 2008 the Oregon
state legislature passed a law creating a system of domestic
131
partnerships.

f. California:Tentative Victory
The example of California is too recent to meaningfully
assess, but following the decision invalidating marriage
licenses issued to same-sex couples following Mayor Gavin
Newsom's order, several couples who had obtained such
licenses as well as the City and County of San Francisco filed a
lawsuit addressing the substantive question of whether the
California state constitution allowed prohibiting marriage for
same-sex couples. On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme
Court held that the state constitution did mandate that
marriage be extended to homosexual as well as heterosexual
couples. 132 At least temporarily, therefore, the right to marry
has been won in California for same-sex couples. A political
battle which all observers predict will be fierce and closelyfought has already begun, however, to add a state
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage to the
supranote 4, at 116.
129 Caleb W. Langston, Comment, Fundamental Right, Fundamentally
Wronged: Oregon's Unconstitutional Stand on Same-Sex Marriage, 84 OR. L.
REV. 861, 861 (2005).
130 Li, 338 Ore. at 398.
131 See Law for Same-Sex Couples is Signed in Oregon, TIMES UNION, May 10,
2007, at A10.
132 In re Marriage Cases, S147999, May 15, 2008, available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S147999.PDF.
128 PINELLO,
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ballot in November, so the ultimate outcome is too tentative at
133
the moment to predict with certainty.
g. Backlash
What
of
Rosenberg's
"stunningly
successful
countermobilization?"'134 It is true that, in addition to the
immediate response after Baehr discussed above, some political
backlash took place across the country. In the wake of
Goodridge, thirteen states passed state constitutional
amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage. 135 Such state
constitutional amendments often go even further than merely
specifying that marriage is only legally valid when between one
man and one woman, and prohibit legal recognition of
marriage-like relationships between same-sex couples. For
example, in Arkansas, the state constitution now prohibits a
"legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or
substantially similar to marital status." 136 Georgia states that
"[n]o union between persons of the same sex shall be recognized
by this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage." 137 Utah's
amendment provides that "[n]o other domestic union, however
denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the
same or substantially equivalent legal effect."13 8 The backlash

thus arguably put same-sex couples in states that passed such
amendments in a worse position: middle-ground routes such as
lobbying for a system of domestic partnerships or civil unions
were closed off to them, and even some of the private regimes
set up to try to approximate some of the legal benefits of
39
marriage were potentially threatened.
John Wildermuth, Next Test for Same-Sex Marriage,S.F. CHRON., May 26,
2008, at Al.
134 ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 417.
135 Cox, supra note 119, at 48.
136 ARK.CONST. of 1874, amend. 83, § 2.
137 GA. CONST. art. I, § IV, para. 1.
13
8 UTAH. CONST. art. I, § 29, cl. 2.
139 For example, some gay rights groups provide guidance regarding how to
privately institute as many of the legal benefits of marriage as possible
through private contract. Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Life
Planning: Legal Documents and Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men
(1998),
available
at
133
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The most restrictive amendments, however, passed in
states that already were hostile to any legal recognition or even
toleration of same-sex relationships.
The constitutional
amendments do close off the state law-based arguments for
same-sex marriage, so make suits such as those successful in
Massachusetts and Vermont untenable. Yet it is difficult to
realistically assign fault to activists for the step backward in a
state like Utah, where there is absolutely no possibility in the
near future that any state recognition or protection of same-sex
relationships will be forthcoming. It is difficult to assess how
much of an effect constitutionalizing the issue has-how much
more difficult it will be to work toward same-sex marriage in
Utah with the issue written into the state constitution. It may
simply have raised the bar of how much political action would
be necessary to allow same-sex marriage through legislative
means. The extreme language of such codifications, however,
may also have strengthened federal law claims, opening a
140
different potential avenue to legal challenge.
In the states passing amendments immediately
following Goodridge, all but one already had both an explicitly
heterosexual definition of marriage in state statutes, which
would have strengthened opposition to legal arguments that
marriage should be understood as an equal right by providing
proof that marriage had been a historically heterosexual
institution; and a state defense of marriage provision specifying
same-sex
relationslps,
from
marriage
to
domestic
partnerships, of other states would not be recognized. 141
The achievements of activists not only in securing samesex marriage outright, but also intermediate steps such as civil
unions, thus defy a binary assessment of the success of the

http://www.lambdalegal.org/sections/library/lifeplanning.pdf. Depending on
how comprehensive such a plan is, some of the particularly stringent state
constitutional amendments could threaten enforcement of such private
contracts.
140 See Dara E. Purvis, The Right to Contract:Use of Domestic Partnershipas
a StrategicAlternative to the Right to Marry Same-Sex Partners,28 WOMEN'S
RTs L. REP. 145 (2007).
141 See Tonja Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The PoliticalPower of Remedial Delay
in Same-Sex MarriageCases, 15 LAW & SExuALITY REVIEW. 11, 11, 44 (2006).
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battle for marriage equality as a simple tally of whether states
allow same-sex marriage.
B. "Everywhere in the Nation"
In assessing whether Rosenberg's claim to evaluate the
success of the same-sex marriage movement on a national
scale, one complicating factor is the participation of different
political units in the dialogue. Although Rosenberg does not
make this argument explicitly, his characterization of legal
activists in a few locations awakening a widespread national
backlash against gay marriage implies that he thinks that part
of the problem was a smaller unit awakening a larger, more
powerful one: activists won a victory at the state level in
Hawaii, but enraged a national community of conservative
opponents that then not only spread a backlash to other state
levels in the state constitutional amendments prohibiting
same-sex marriage, but channeled a national backlash into
such actions as the federal Defense of Marriage Act, President
Bush's calls for a federal constitutional amendment forbidding
gay marriage, and exploitation of same-sex marriage in the
2004 national elections.
Rosenberg is obviously correct that a state-level action
caused reactions at both the national level and at the state
level in other distant states. He allows for a single category of
same-sex marriage litigation inspiring pro-gay marriage
activism: "supporters of same-sex marriage who held elective
office" taking independent action, 142 such as Mayor Gavin
Newsom's attempts to allow gay marriage in San Francisco. 14 3
Rosenberg argues that every state marriage case prompted
backlash across the country that should be taken into account
in evaluating the success of the movement generally. This
focus on national backlash when evaluating the success of
state-level efforts, however, may not be accurate as to the goals
of the state-level efforts.

142 ROSENBERG,

supra note 6, at 360.

See Rachel Gordon, San Francisco Defies Law, Marries Gays, SAN
FRANcisco CHRONICLE., Feb. 13, 2004, at Al.
143
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In Massachusetts, for example, Rosenberg at least
initially believed that litigation had been "a disaster." 144 Yet
within Massachusetts, gay marriage has become popularly
accepted. 145 Goodridge did not trigger a successful backlash on
the state level. Rosenberg claims to judge legal activists by
their own terms-he uses this argument to justify terming
anything less than outright marriage a failure. But he seems
to consider all the legal activists working in every state a single
entity when determining his goal for pro-same-sex marriage
activists. It is undoubtedly true that Lambda Legal lawyers in
Hawaii hope that the right to same-sex marriage will be
achieved nationwide. But by "their own terms" of the lawsuit
filed in Hawaii state court on Hawaii state law claims, at least
their immediate goal is merely achieving the right to same-sex
marriage in Hawaii. By this logic, the goals of activists should
be defined more specifically as to the actions they take, and
evaluated accordingly.
Obviously, even a successful local or state action can
prompt backlash elsewhere in the country. It is not this
Article's argument that activism should be evaluated entirely
piecemeal and individually. But it stretches the bounds of
neutral analysis to only recognize the broadest definition of
"victory" while acknowledging every negative consequence that
might be tied to litigation. Rosenberg defines victory for samesex marriage litigation extremely narrowly, but lumps all the
negative responses to the litigation together into an amorphous
and intimidating single backlash movement. This is not to say
that the activists achieved their goals entirely-but it does
indicate that Rosenberg's definition of the national goal is too
generalized. In order to effectively evaluate the success of the
movement, the goal should be understood to take into account
the different scopes of action.
PART IV - COORDINATING LEGAL AND POLITICAL
Rosenberg argues that legal activists lack any strategy
as to political action to support victories won in court.
144

ROSENBERG, supra note 613, at 338.
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See Jacobi, supranote 141, at 39-41.
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Rosenberg has characterized such an absence as a complete
failure to organize or devote resources to political activism in
addition to legal battles:
One of the responses I often hear from
progressive lawyers is . . . 'Well, of course we are
more sophisticated. This is part of a multi-tiered
strategy.' And I say, 'Oh. Well, that's interesting.
What have you been doing on the rest of the
strategy? What part of your budget goes to this?'
And they respond: 'We are really not doing much
now, but we are depending on other people.' So I
do not believe it.146
Rosenberg paints legal activists with a broad brush as
lacking political organization and strategy. He claims that the
advocates for same-sex marriage failed entirely to coordinate
legal and political efforts. This was likely true at the very
beginning of legal campaigns, as the backlash to Baehr v.
Lewin indicates. If progressives improved their political and
legal coordination in later cases, however, Rosenberg's general
assessment should be qualified.
A. Hawaii: Unpreparedand Ill-Equipped
Rosenberg's analysis of legal activists working toward
same-sex marriage as completely ineffectual against a powerful
conservative backlash is clearly accurate as to Hawaii. Clearly,
the plaintiffs who brought the case and activist groups such as
Lambda and the ACLU who became involved afterwards, did
not anticipate the political battle that arose and had no
strategy to combat it.
In contrast, opponents to gay marriage across the
country were spurred into action much more than supporters.
Gay activists across the country did not seem to have any
political response to an explosive backlash when the news from
Hawaii prompted congressional representatives to introduce

146

ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 818.

2009

EVALUATING LEGA AcrvIsM

the Defense of Marriage Act, 147 specifying that no state had to
recognize the same-sex marriage granted by another state and
forbidding the federal government from recognizing same-sex
marriages. Indeed, the bill swiftly passed by extremely wide
48
margins.1
Hawaii is the obvious example of virtually no political
planning or activism, but it is also the obvious example of legal
activists having little planning time at all, since the case was
essentially thrust upon them already in progress. It is thus
perhaps understandable that they did not also contemplate a
larger political campaign. In states in which the legal activists
exercised more agency, however, more political planning took
place.
B. Vermont: Organizationand Allies
As Baehr came out in Hawaii, Vermont was embroiled
in a controversy regarding adoption by gay parents that
involved simultaneous legal and political action, meaning that
as gay marriage entered the political debate connections
between legal and political activists were already relatively
strong. Adoption by gay parents had been one of the issues
that gay rights activists began to pursue in the 1990s, although
the issue was pursued first in the courts. In 1993, the Vermont
Supreme Court became the first in the country to approve
second -parent adopton by a same-sex partner,4 as the state
legislature worked on a general reform of state adoption laws.
After the state court's decision, several state legislators
unsuccessfully attempted to add amendments to the law
forbidding homosexuals to adopt. 150 The adoption battle had
several important effects. One consequence of the existing
adoption battle was that Baehr was not the first spectre of a
claim to an important social institution-parenthood rather
than marriage-that Vermont citizens were confronted by. To
the extent some of the backlash to Baehr on the national level
147 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (.1996).
48
1
d.ESKRIDGE, supra note 51, at 39.
1491n re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1271 (Vt. 1993).
150 MOATS, supra note 11, at 97-99.

52

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY

Vol. XVII

was shock, therefore, the impact was blunted in Vermont.
Second, Vermont was simply distracted from the marriage
issue by the arguments about adoption in which it was already
embroiled.
Finally, the lines for a battle over same-sex
marriage had already been drawn: activists on both sides of the
homosexual adoption debate were mobilized and had already
fought several battles in the legislature and in the courts.
After Baker v. State shifted the question of same-sex
marriage in Vermont into the legislature, the activism changed
entirely from legal to political.
Even though the legal
argument had, at least in principle, been won by proponents of
same-sex marriage, moving the argument into the political
branches changed both the arguments and the advocates.
Rather than the legal, rights-based arguments presented in
court, the legislature debated the policy implications of various
proposals. In Hawaii, as the issue moved from legal to political
forums the supporters of same-sex marriage were ill-equipped
and unprepared to counter conservative advocacy. In Vermont,
by contrast, the players were already in place. This was partly
due to the previous battles over gay adoption, but the Vermont
Freedom to Marry Task Force had also envisioned the battle
for public support that same-sex marriage would face, so had at
least begun to strategize media and political campaigns.
Additionally, from the outset of the case the lawyers involved,
determined to learn from Hawaii's mistakes, strategized how to
best present their case to the public. For example, VCGLR
held speaker's training sessions for lawyers who would be
called upon to discuss the court case to the media, with quite
clear talking points: (1) remember your audience (the
"winnable middle"), (2) don't lose self-control when arguing,
51
and (3) speak to people's hearts as well as their heads.
Vermont same-sex marriage advocates also had an
important political leader in the legislature; Bill Lippert.
Lippert, a member of the House of Representatives, was the
only openly gay state legislator, and knew early in his political
career that he would likely have an opportunity to affect laws
protecting or restricting gay rights in Vermont. Five years
before, he had taken a position on the House Judiciary
151

Murray & Robinson, supra note 53, at 38.
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Committee specifically because he thought that committee
would give him the most power over the progress of laws
affecting gay rights. 152 At the time that same-sex marriage was
handed to the legislature by the state supreme court, Lippert
was the ranking Democrat on the committee and served as Vice
Chairman, giving him considerable power.
Proponents of
same-sex marriage thus had an extremely influential and wellplaced advocate in the legislature just as the issue became
active.
Vermont therefore had two very important factors
affecting the fight over same-sex marriage: a support structure
of existing gay rights organizations in place and well-positioned
supporters in the legislature with considerable agenda control.
Despite the better preparedness of proponents of samesex marriage, however, the debate was still extremely
contentious. The House of Representatives took on the issue
first, and from the beginning involved the public in a very
direct way, meaning that the grassroots support for the legal
activism was extremely important as those ground-level
supporters had direct input in the political debate.
The
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, where the first debate
was held, sent a memo to committee members asking them to
not publicly take a position on the issue until after a series of
public hearings were held. 153 The committee then held a series
of town hall-style meetings, where over one hundred members
of the public testified each time. 54 The grassroots organization
of bringing supporters of sarne-sex marriage out to speak at
such meetings was therefore crucial in reaching the committee
members.
After a long and impassioned debate, the committee
eventually voted to create a system of civil unions, rather than
marriage outright. 155 The full House then similarly votedbecause Vermont requires multiple readings and votes on a
single bill before it becomes law, voted more than once. The
Senate subsequently passed a civil unions bill almost identical
to the House version, the House endorsed the Senate's bill, and
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 155.
154 Id. at 164-79.
155 Id. at 188.
152
153
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Governor Dean signed it into law-uncharacteristically,
without any publicity or supporters of the bill present for the
156
signing.
As Rosenberg acknowledges, the backlash felt in
Vermont was extremely small compared to the reaction in
Hawaii. Conservative politicians did try to capitalize on the
issue: the slogans "Take back Vermont" and "Remember in
November" became popular as bumper stickers to remind
Vermont citizens to vote against legislators who had voted for
the civil unions bill. 157 Some Democrats did lose their seats,
but the effect was relatively small. The Senate remained
controlled by a Democratic majority, although by a smaller
158
margin than before, and Governor Dean was reelected.
The lesser backlash of Vermont, therefore, is due to
more than the structural factors Rosenberg identifies that do
not give any credit to the preparedness of Vermont activists for
political and social campaigns. The political resolution of was
due in no small part to the greater readiness of activists across
the state. One reason for the greater preparedness was the
recent history of other legal and political battles concerning the
rights of gay Vermont citizens. Another, however, has to do
with the support within the activist community for the lawsuit.
In Vermont, as considered in Section II.C, the lawsuit was not
brought until a groundswell of support among interested
VCGLR members made it clear that the community of
politically active gay or pro-gay rights Vermont citizens wanted
such a case filed. Obeying the wishes of the public meant that
when the state supreme court handed the issue over to the
legislature, that same group of active citizens who pushed for
the case were ready to actively lobby their representatives to
pass a statute supporting gay relationships in some form.
Finally, the legal activists organized attorneys involved in the
case to present an appealing, persuasive argument for the
lawsuit and a support structure of political organizers and
well-positioned allies in the legislature worked together to

156

Id. at 242.

157 Id. at 251.
158 Id. at 260-61.
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carry the movement forward once it moved into the political
arena.
C. Massachusetts:The Importance of Allies
As in Vermont, gay activists in Massachusetts had
engaged in political battles over gay rights issues in the state
legislature prior to the same-sex marriage case. For example,
the Massachusetts Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus
successfully lobbied in 1989 to add sexual orientation to the list
of protected characteristics in state laws prohibiting
discrimination in government employment. 159
As outlined above, the debate over same-sex marriage in
Massachusetts began with a strong conservative effort to
prohibit same-sex marriage in the state constitution. An
extremely well-organized group of allies in the state
legislature, however, took extremely aggressive measures to
prevent the amendment from passing, using procedural
maneuvers to avoid a vote that the progressive politicians were
worried they would lose.
The delay orchestrated by Massachusetts state
legislators gave the legal activists time to file and win
Goodridge. Once the debate moved into the legislature after
the initial decision, moreover, state senators asked for an
advisory opinion from the court as to whether marriage or an
intermediate option such as civil unions was mandated by
Goodridge, and after the court's opinion stating that only
marriage would remedy the state constitutional violation, the
legislature allowed the court's opinion instituting marriage 180
days after the decision was issued to go into effect.
After Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples, there were several attempts to reverse the
court's decision through the political process. Conservatives in
Massachusetts proposed several amendments to the state
constitution in attempts to supersede Goodridge. At the next
convention to discuss possible amendments to the state
constitution, legislators debated the issue, but again political
allies fought strenuously against such efforts.
159 PINELLO,

supranote 4, at 34.
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The fact that the question had been decided as a legal
matter provided further sources of argument for sympathetic
legislators. In other words, the characterisation of the issue as
a question of legal rights rather than policy preferences
affected how the legislators thought of the propriety of action
through the political process. For example, one State Senator
argued in debate, 'We are talking about equality, and that is
why we should not put this on the ballot. This is not a tax
matter for the ballot. This is about rights ....
160
are no way to protect fundamental rights.'

Popular votes

Furthermore, the Massachusetts electorate seemed to
support the concept of same-sex marriage: in an intervening
election following the first state convention after licenses were
issued to homosexual couples, how legislators up for reelection
had voted on whether to allow same-sex marriage licenses did
not seem to have any impact on whether they kept their seat or
were defeated. 61 Faced with voter apathy on the issue, the
next vote on a constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex
marriage failed by a vote of one hundred fifty-seven to thirty162
nine, and the issue has been effectively settled ever since.
As Rosenberg points out, Massachusetts is a politically
liberal state, so it is unsurprising that there was less
opposition to same-sex marriage than in less hospitable
locations.
The debate over same-sex marriage within
Massachusetts was strongly, probably determinatively, affected
by strong support and activism by political allies. Indeed,
activists were able to file the case only because political allies
held off a strong attempt to amend the state constitution.
Massachusetts thus is an example of very strong political
support within the legislature for the legal activism.
D. Oregon:Political Victory to Legal Defeat to Political Victory
Rosenberg does not discuss the example of Oregon in
detail in The Hollow Hope, in part because the most recent
developments took place over the last few months and thus
160 PINELLO, supra note 4, at 65.
161 Id. at 69-71.
162 Id. at 71.
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were probably too recent to put into print. The multiplicity of
the efforts within the state, however, indicate that activists
continue to improve the integration of political and legal
activism.
The first battle in Oregon, as summarized in Section
II.E, began as grassroots pressure on Basic Rights Oregon,
moved into internal government action with the Multnomah
County commissioners and attorney, then to the legal arena
with the subsequent court case between different levels of state
and local government, where it was defeated. The effort began,
however, with lobbying local government leaders rather than a
lawsuit, and won over those leaders to the extent that it was
the county government that filed the lawsuit.
In the last few months, however, the Oregon state
163
legislature passed a law instituting domestic partnerships.
Progressive state legislators had introduced such bills before,
but had been stymied by conservative legislators until the 2007
legislative session. 16 After the bill was signed into law and
was scheduled to take effect, conservative activists attempted
to put a referendum on the public ballot repealing the law, but
failed to secure the required number of signatures. A group of
conservative activists then sued to challenge the actions of
election officials who rejected some signatures, but lost in
court.1 65 The law thus took effect on February 4, 2008, and
within a month over 1300 same-sex couples had registered as
domestic partners with the state. 66 While Rosenberg was
unable to include the recent Oregon developments in his book,
therefore, the domestic partnership law provides strong
evidence that the movement for same-sex marriage
increasingly integrates legal and political efforts.

163 Ashbel S. Green, Civil Unions Get the Nod in Oregon, OREGONIAN, Feb. 2,

2008, at Al.
164 Law for Same-Sex Couples is Signed in Oregon, TIMES UNION, May 10,
2007, at A10.
165 Green, supra note 163.
166 Bill Graves, About 1,300 in Oregon Register for Civil Unions, OREGONIAN,
March 3, 2008, at E3.
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E. New Jersey: Integrated,Alternated Achievements
The New Jersey movement for same-sex marriage is an
example of a nearly entirely integrated legal and political
campaign. As the New Jersey chapter of Lambda Legal
discussed whether to file a lawsuit patterned after other
successful cases, it decided to work explicitly to prevent a
defeat as in Hawaii. Therefore, the activists borrowed the
practice of town meetings from Vermont, and held a series of
public meetings run by a professional consultant aimed at
raising public awareness and creating an educational and
persuasive message in support of same-sex marriage.167
The integration carried forward into the alternating
resolutions in the legal and political arenas. After Lambda lost
its case in the trial court, 168 but before the appeal was decided,
the state legislature passed into law a domestic partnerships
170
After victory in the state supreme court,
statute. 169
moreover, the state legislature under direction from the court
171
passed a civil unions bill.
In many ways, New Jersey is precisely what Rosenberg
claims the modern same-sex marriage movement lacks. The
campaign within New Jersey took advantage of the momentum
and lessons learned from earlier examples. The activists
worked simultaneously within the political and legal spheres,
and were able to win incremental battles in both. The political
and legal strategies were entirely integrated and become
interdependent, as the civil unions bill was passed under the
order of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

Rosenberg argues in the updated Hollow Hope that the
litigation movement for same-sex marriage has been close to an
Id.
See Lewis v. Harris, 378 N.J. Super. 168, 175-76 (2005). The trial court's
opinion was unpublished.
169 Pople, supra note 65, at 55.
170 Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 463 (2006).
171 N.J. Lawmakers OK Civil Unions, Not Same-Sex Marriage, CNN.COM, Dec.
14, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/12/14/same.sex/index.html.
167
168
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abject failure, prompting far more negative action in the form
of backlash across the country than winning any victories. He
claims that this failure is the consequence of legal activists
choosing to move the battle over same-sex marriage into the
courts too quickly, that the success of such activists can be
measured via a dichotomy of whether or not same-sex marriage
was achieved, and that activists have not successfully
integrated political activism into their legal actions.
This Article has examined each of these claims in depth
and tested their validity, and in each case has demonstrated
that Rosenberg's assertions should at least be significantly
qualified. Legal activists often did not choose to file lawsuits,
but joined lawsuits already in progress or were pushed into
action by existing political fights. Activists worked for samesex marriage generally, but also served related but distinct
goals such as affecting activist agendas, and chose to express
their goals in strong terms as a rhetorical strategy rather than
an expression of "marriage or bust." Legal activists, thrust into
the fight over same-sex marriage, did entirely lack political
organization initially, but as the fights have continued have
learned from previous mistakes and demonstrate increasing
sophistication and success in their political activism and
coordination.
Rosenberg's claims as to same-sex marriage, therefore,
might be restated to account for a more nuanced understanding
of the historical record. This amending of his assertions
regarding same-sex marriage does not disprove his overall
thesis that legal activism will not by itself produce lasting
social change, nor does it deny that elements of the same-sex
marriage debate support his argument. The strength of that
support, however, is affected by the imprecision of his theses,
and to the extent that strong examples can also be marshaled
that entirely contradict his claims, examples from within the
same-sex marriage debate also provide strong evidence against
portions of his general arguments.

